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The title of this book is maybe a  bit misleading or even silly, but its 
basic meaning and the underlying topic is not: Generally speaking, the 
question is how to think about the relation of God to morality. one 
answer would be that there is none because one of the relata is missing; 
there is no God, therefore there is and can be no relation between God 
and morality. Another answer would be that there is no morality because 
there is no God (along the lines of the often quoted Dostoyevsky remark 
that, if God does not exist, then everything is permitted – except that 
it wouldn’t even be true that everything is permitted because the very 
idea of permission only makes sense if there are actions that do have 
the moral quality of being permitted in which case there is morality). 
According to this answer, God’s existence is in one way or another 
related to morality such that there can be no morality – i.e. there can be 
no universal, objective, intrinsic rules or goods – unless there is God. 
one way to understand this is such that God’s volition makes actions or 
states of affairs good; another would be that God himself is goodness. Yet 
another way to look at these things would be to hold that God does exist, 
and yet morality (or at least most of it) exists independently of God just 
as the realm of logic is independent of God (a position defended in our 
times and in this book by richard swinburne). on the other hand, some 
even claim that if there is morality, then there is God such that the reality 
of morality is evidence for the existence of God.
The book is structured as follows: After an introduction by the editors, 
Paul Kurtz and William lane Craig lay out their answers to the leading 
question of whether goodness without God is good enough. Though 
they set the stage for the entire book they don’t reflect sufficiently the 
very meaning of this question; both Hare (p.85) and murphy (p.117 f.) 
note this critically. Part II presents “new essays” by C. stephen laymen, 
louise Antony, John Hare, Walter sinnott-Armstrong, mark C. murphy, 
Donald C. Hubin, and richard swinburne. These essays are supposed 
to react to the arguments put forward by Kurtz and Craig; but they do 
so only in a very limited way. In turn, part III allows Craig and Kurtz to 
reply to these essays and to clarify their positions.
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Given his previous philosophical and theological works as a Christian 
apologist, it’s no surprise that William lane Craig lays out a  theistic 
view according to which there can be no objective moral world without 
God, whereas Paul Kurtz (and later Walter sinnott-Armstrong), being 
a secular humanist, pictures morality as something that needs no deeper 
ontological foundation so that one can and shall be moral without God. 
Although I ultimately agree with Craig’s general position, neither he nor 
Kurtz wins the debate. still, Craig’s critical position is well taken: unless 
we understand goodness as an intrinsic property of goods or actions, 
there’s no way to account for the objectivity of morality. Now Kurtz seems 
to agree with this by saying that the human life “is intrinsically good in 
itself” (28); but he simply can provide no answer to the question from 
whence this quality stems (especially in a world described in terms of 
naturalism). Craig, on the other hand, doesn’t reckon with the possibility 
of what C. stephen layman calls “moral Platonism” (51), i.e. that belief 
that goodness is a Platonic quality that is no more (but certainly no less) 
stunning than any other property there is; it’s simply there. layman 
sketches a moral argument for the existence of God, claiming that the 
germane moral quality (the overridingness of moral obligations) is best 
explained by God (and/or an afterlife). louise Antony criticizes Divine 
Command Theory for well known reasons and even thinks that there is 
reason not to believe in God because perfect contrition could only be 
possible if there is no God. John Hare sketches what he has developed 
elsewhere at quite some length. basically, the (Kantian) idea is that we 
ought to care for our own and other people’s happiness and that we 
ought to become better, less self-centred human beings; since ought 
implies can, and these aims cannot be achieved without God, it would be 
rationally unstable not to believe in God. sinnott-Armstrong provides 
no arguments that have not already been articulated in his book with 
William lane Craig (God? A debate between a Christian and an Atheist). 
Again, he sharply attacks Craig’s theistic approach and tries to defend his 
own “harm-based morality” (101); still he does not give an argument why 
any harm, that is not my own or that of my beloved, should bother me. 
(What’s wrong with harm anyway? Its wrongness must be intrinsic, and 
this is something atheists like sinnott-Armstrong don’t buy into.) maybe 
the best paper is murphy’s; in any event, he is the one who develops in 
an intelligible way the basic questions that need to be answered (what 
is morality, after all, and how can it be grounded?) though his own 
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answer is based on robert Adam’s social concept of obligation that has 
difficulties of its own.
The topic of this book is old and has been debated almost ever since 
there is philosophy (just think about Plato’s euthyphro-problem: Does 
God command good actions because they are good, or are actions good 
because God commands them?). The book does not offer any substantial 
new perspectives or aspects on this topic; this is partly due to the fact 
that it is very hard to come up with anything new anyway, partly due to 
the fact that those thoughts that are somewhat fresh (say by Craig, Hare, 
murphy, or swinburne) have been published, and published in much 
more detail, in similar ways by these and other philosophers elsewhere. 
still the book is laudable: It provides a good overview of what the main 
problems and arguments in this field are, and most papers are written 
by philosophers who know their stuff and express there thoughts in 
integrating contemporary moral philosophy and epistemology.
DAVID eFIrD
University of York
Anna Marmodoro and Jonathan Hill (eds.), The Metaphysics of the 
Incarnation, Oxford University Press, 2011.
‘In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the 
Word was God ... and the Word became flesh and lived among us’, so 
writes John the evangelist in the prologue of his Gospel. but how 
could the Word become flesh? That is, how could God become human? 
Answering this question is the primary concern of this anthology.
According to the Gospel of luke, when the angel Gabriel announced 
to mary that she would bear a son, she replied ‘How can this be?’ since 
she was a virgin. The angel replied that it would be by an overshadowing 
of the Holy spirit. one can view the papers in this anthology as possible 
continuations of the angel’s answer, for having given an account of how 
a virgin could conceive and bear a son, the question remains how the son 
she is to bear could be God the son. For this anthology aims to provide 
an account of how it is that God, or more precisely, God the son, the 
second person of the Trinity, could become human while remaining 
divine and a  single person. In this anthology, Jonathan Hill provides 
